Behaviour-based safety

Foundations and elements of the approach

The approach is based on the antecedent-behavior-consequence model: behaviors are activated by antecedents (information, training, signals, procedures, supervisory example) and maintained or extinguished by their consequences (recognition, convenience, time savings, correction, sanction). Unsafe behaviors usually have immediate and positive consequences for the person performing them (speed, less effort), while their negative consequences are unlikely and delayed. Behavior-based safety seeks to reverse this balance by ensuring that safe behavior receives immediate and frequent positive consequences, primarily through social recognition and feedback.

The usual elements of a program are: the identification of critical behaviors from the risk assessment and the analysis of accidents and incidents; the development of checklists with observable definitions; systematic observation by trained colleagues or supervisors, anonymous with respect to the person being observed and focused on the behavior and not on the person; immediate feedback, positive for safe behaviors and constructive for unsafe ones, with joint analysis of the causes; the recording and analysis of the data (percentage of safe behaviors by category and area); and the definition of actions on the antecedents and conditions that hinder safe behavior (tools, procedures, time pressure, job design).

The review published in Occupational Medicine and Safety in 2015 shows highly variable reductions in workplace accidents across studies, with better results when the program is supported by supervision, participatory leadership, and cultural transformation. It also points out limitations such as observer subjectivity and historical criticism of the Heinrich model, which attributed most accidents to unsafe acts without explaining why people behave that way. The evidence therefore supports using this approach as a tool within a preventative culture, rather than as an isolated program.

Conditions for a correct application

• Priority of working conditions. The principles of Article 15 of Law 31/1995 (avoiding risks, combating them at their source, adapting work to the person, collective protection before individual protection) apply before any action on behavior.
• Participation. Design of the program with the consultation and participation of the workers and their representatives, in accordance with Chapter V of Law 31/1995, and with trained volunteer observers.
• Non-punitive. Observations are not used to punish or evaluate individual performance; they focus on behavior and its causes, not on the person.
• Root cause analysis. Each observed unsafe behavior is analyzed to identify the system factors that contribute to it (procedures, resources, pressure, training) and action is taken on them.
• Leadership. Visible commitment from management and supervisors, who participate in observations and respond to proposed actions.
• Data protection and confidentiality. Recording of observations without identifying the people observed and with the guarantees of data protection regulations.
• Integration. Linkage with risk assessment, incident investigation, training and management system indicators.
• Evaluation. Measurement of the evolution of safe behaviors and accident indicators, and review of the program.

Criticisms and risks of improper use

• Blame. Attributing accidents to individual errors and diverting attention from deficiencies in working conditions and the organization.
• Replacement of technical measures. Use the program to avoid investments in design, equipment or collective protection.
• Pressure to report. Incentives linked to the absence of accidents discourage the reporting of incidents and damages.
• Surveillance. Use of observations as a disciplinary control, with effects on climate and trust.
• Rejection of representation. Programs imposed without consultation or participation, which the workers’ representatives can challenge with justification.
• Observer bias. Variability and subjectivity in observations if there are no clear definitions, training, and calibration.
• Sustainability. Loss of effectiveness when management support falls or the program becomes a mere formality.

Organizational application: how to implement a behavior-based safety program

1. Verify that working conditions are controlled according to the risk assessment and that the management system has sufficient maturity (leadership, incident investigation, participation).
2. Consult the program with the worker safety representatives and the health and safety committee, and agree on its principles: voluntary participation of observers, non-punitive nature, anonymity of the people observed and data protection.
3. Identify critical behaviors based on risk assessment and accident and incident analysis, and develop checklists with observable definitions.
4. Train observers in observation, feedback and root cause analysis, and calibrate criteria among them.
5. Conduct planned observations with immediate feedback, record data without identifying individuals, and analyze the causes of unsafe behaviors.
6. Define and execute actions on the background and conditions (procedures, means, design, time pressure) with responsible parties and deadlines, and communicate the results.
7. Measure the evolution of safe behaviors and accident rates, review the program in the committee and in the management review and adjust it.

Preventive management software allows you to plan observations, record data anonymously, analyze the percentages of safe behaviors by category and area, manage the resulting actions, and relate the results to risk assessment, incidents, and training with traceability.

Limits and common mistakes

1. Implementing the program without having previously checked the working conditions, or using it to justify the lack of technical measures.
2. Convert the observations into a disciplinary or individual assessment tool.
3. Linking incentives to the absence of accidents discourages reporting.
4. Design the program without consultation or participation of the workers’ representatives.
5. Failure to analyze and correct the systemic causes that favor unsafe behaviors.
6. Leaving the program when management support declines or when it becomes a formality without feedback.

The foundations and evidence for the approach are found in the cited scientific literature and in the guidelines on preventive culture; this sheet is for informational purposes.

Regulatory and reference framework

• Law 31/1995, of November 8. Law on Prevention of Occupational Risks; principles of preventive action (article 15) andworker consultation and participation (articles 33 to 40).
• Royal Decree 39/1997, of January 17. Regulation of Prevention Services; integration of prevention and risk assessment.
• ISO 45001:2018 . Occupational health and safety management systems; leadership, participation and culture.
• Martínez Oropesa, C. (2015). Behavior-based safety management: a process that works? Review published in Occupational Medicine and Safety, 61(241), 424-435.
• EU-OSHA. Leadership and worker participation . Guidelines on leadership and participation as the basis of a preventive culture.
• Organic Law 3/2018, of December 5. Protection of Personal Data and guarantee of digital rights; processing of observation data.

ISO 45003 and INSST materials on preventive culture and psychosocial risks provide complementary criteria on leadership, participation and safety climate.